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Construction Law
by Frank O. Brown, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article focuses on noteworthy decisions by Georgia appellate
courts and Georgia federal district courts between June 1, 2018 and
May 31, 2019, that are relevant to the practice of construction law. 1
II. ARBITRATION
In Web IV, LLC v. Samples Construction, LLC,2 the defendants
contended that the plaintiff construction company had waived its right
to compel arbitration by allegedly failing to comply with a provision in
the subject contract requiring a pre-arbitration attempt to resolve the
dispute through the parties’ respective representatives. 3 The issue
before the Georgia Court of Appeals was whether the court or the
arbitrator should decide the waiver issue.4
The court held that the arbitrator should decide that issue for several
reasons, including that it was a threshold procedural issue rather than
a threshold issue of substantive arbitrability. 5 The court distinguished
threshold procedural waiver issues that grow out of the dispute, such as
the subject waiver issue, from threshold substantive conduct-based
waiver issues.6
In deciding if the arbitrator, rather than the court, should decide the
waiver issue, the court also relied on two other factors. One was the

*Shareholder, Weissman, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia; General Counsel, Greater Atlanta
Home Builders Association, Inc. Rhodes College (B.A., 1976); Emory University School of
Law (J.D., 1979). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of construction law during the prior survey period, see Frank O.
Brown, Jr., Construction Law, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 70 MERCER L. REV. 51
(2018).
2. 349 Ga. App. 607, 824 S.E.2d 107 (2019).
3. Id. at 607, 824 S.E.2d at 108.
4. Id. at 609, 824 S.E.2d at 110.
5. Id. at 611, 824 S.E.2d at 111.
6. Id.
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significant breadth of the parties’ arbitration provision, which was
actually rather standard in its breadth, and which stated that all claims
“arising out of or relating to the Agreement” were subject to
arbitration.7 The second factor was that the arbitration provision
incorporated the American Arbitration Association Construction
Industry Arbitration Rules, which gave the arbitrator “the power to rule
on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to
the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement.”8
In Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Jakks Pacific, Inc.,9 the
arbitrator awarded attorney’s fees and expenses to Original
Appalachian Artworks, Inc., after which Jakks Pacific, Inc. (Jakks) filed
a motion seeking to vacate that award. 10 The parties disagreed about
whether the motion was to be determined under the relevant provision
of the Federal Arbitration Act11 or the Georgia Arbitration Code.12 The
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia did
not decide that issue because it determined that the result would be the
same under either provision.13
One of the grounds for vacating an award under the Federal
Arbitration Act is that the arbitrator exceeded his power. 14 Jakks
argued the arbitrator had exceeded his power because he had awarded
fees and expenses for a period of ten months of arbitration when the
arbitration provision of the parties’ contract stated that the arbitration
should be conducted within sixty days from the demand for
arbitration.15 The court rejected that argument, noting that under the
cited case law, an arbitrator does not exceed his authority even if the
award is based on an “incorrect legal conclusion” or a “manifest
disregard of the law.”16 The court determined that in order to uphold
the award against a contention that the arbitrator exceeded his power,
it is sufficient to demonstrate that the arbitrator even arguably
interpreted the parties’ contract.17 The court found that it was clear

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id. at 612–13, 824 S.E.2d at 112.
No. 1:14-CV-02861-ELR, 2018 WL 7823065 (N.D. Ga. June 7, 2018).
Id. at *1.
9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2019).
O.C.G.A. §§ 9-9-1–9-9-18 (2019).
Jakks Pacific, Inc., 2018 WL 7823065, at *2.
9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2019).
Jakks Pacific, Inc., 2018 WL 7823065, at *3.
Id.
Id. at *4.

[4] CONSTRUCTION LAW-BP (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

CONSTRUCTION LAW

11/26/2019 10:59 AM

59

from the evidence that the arbitrator had, in fact, interpreted the
arbitration provision of the contract.18
Another one of the grounds for vacating an award under the Georgia
Arbitration Code is that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law. 19
Jakks contended that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law, in
part, because he should have limited attorney’s fees and expenses to the
sixty-day period mentioned in the parties’ arbitration provision. 20 The
trial court noted that to prove manifest disregard of the law, a party
must demonstrate more than that the arbitrator misapplied the law to
the facts or incorrectly interpreted the law.21 Instead, the party must
provide evidence of record that the correct law was communicated to the
arbitrator, and the arbitrator intentionally and knowingly chose to
ignore that law.22 The court concluded that Jakks had failed to provide
that evidence.23 Thus, the court also declined to vacate the award under
the Georgia Arbitration Act.24
III. CONTRACT DISCLAIMERS
An issue in Georgian Fine Properties, LLC v. Lang,25 was whether
the plaintiff homeowners’ negligent construction claims against the
seller, who was also the contractor that had renovated the home, were
barred by a provision in the parties’ agreement that “[i]n the event
Buyer does not terminate this Agreement prior to the end of the Due
Diligence period, then . . . Buyer shall have accepted the Property ‘as is’
subject to the terms of this Agreement[.]” 26 The plaintiffs did not
terminate the agreement.27
The Georgia Court of Appeals held that the “as is” provision did not
bar plaintiffs’ negligent construction claims. 28 The court stated that the
“as is” provision bars only breach of warranty claims, not negligent
construction claims.29

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b)(5) (2019).
Jakks Pacific, Inc., 2018 WL 7823065, at *5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *6.
347 Ga. App. 635, 820 S.E.2d 464 (2018).
Id. at 637–38, 820 S.E.2d at 466–67.
Id. at 637, 820 S.E.2d at 466.
Id. at 638, 820 S.E.2d at 466.
Id. at 638, 820 S.E.2d at 467.
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IV. DAMAGES LIMITATIONS
Construction-related
contracts sometimes include
damages
limitations and other exculpatory provisions. Although not involving a
construction contract, Warren Averett, LLC v. Landcastle Acquisition
Corporation,30 addressed the enforceability of a damages limitation
provision in a series of an accounting firm’s audit contracts with a law
firm.31 The provision stated that “[i]n any event, no claim shall be
asserted which is in excess of the lesser of actual damages incurred or
professional fees paid to us for the engagement.”32 The fees paid by the
accounting firm totaled about $87,000. The actual damages alleged by
the plaintiff, which was an assignee of the law firm, were in excess of
$17,500,000.33 Thus, the enforceability of the damages limitation was
critical to the defense of the claim.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the
damages limitation was unenforceable as a matter of law because it was
insufficiently prominent.34 According to the court, exculpatory clauses,
including damages limitations, must be explicit, clear, unambiguous,
and prominent.35 The court noted that in determining whether an
exculpatory provision is sufficiently prominent, courts consider a
number of factors, including whether it is in a separate paragraph, has
a separate heading, or is distinguished by features like font size. 36
The court held that the subject damages limitation provision failed
the prominence element because it was in the same font as the rest of
the subject agreements, was not capitalized, italicized, or set in bold
type for emphasis, was not in a separate section that specifically and
only addressed recoverable damages, and was not in a prominent place
within the contracts that emphasized its importance, such as being next
to the parties’ signature lines.37
In US Nitrogen, LLC v. Weatherly, Inc.,38 the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia considered whether a
contract provision was a permissible damages limitation or an
impermissible indemnification provision in violation of O.C.G.A.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

349 Ga. App. 479, 825 S.E.2d 864 (2019).
Id. at 479, 825 S.E.2d at 865.
Id. at 481, 825 S.E.2d at 867.
Id. at 481, 825 S.E.2d at 866.
Id. at 484, 825 S.E.2d at 868.
Id. at 483, 825 S.E.2d at 868.
Id. at 484, 825 S.E.2d at 868–69.
Id. at 484–85, 825 S.E.2d at 869.
343 F. Supp. 3d 1354 (N.D. Ga. 2018).
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§ 13-8-2(b),39
which
restricts
indemnification
provisions
in
construction-related contracts.40 The subject contract provision stated
“Weatherly’s total aggregate liability to [USN], except with respect of
Weatherly’s cost of performing the Work under the Contract, for all
causes including defects, Weatherly defaults, default of any warranties,
or guarantees, patent infringement, or otherwise, shall not exceed
fifteen percent (15%) of the Price.”41
The district court concluded that this provision merely limited
Weatherly’s liability to US Nitrogen, not to third parties. 42 Thus, it was
an enforceable damages limitation provision and not an unenforceable
indemnification under O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b) by US Nitrogen of
Weatherly as to claims by third parties.43
V. INDEMNIFICATION PROVISIONS44
Construction and construction-related contracts frequently include
indemnification provisions. At issue in Sherwood v. Williams,45 was
whether an indemnification provision covered the negligence of the
indemnitee.46 That provision stated that the tenant indemnitor would
hold the landlord indemnitee harmless from any liability or damage,
whether caused by the indemnitor’s “operations or otherwise.” 47 The
indemnitee argued that this language covered claims against the
indemnitee for the indemnitee’s own negligence.48
The court of appeals rejected that argument noting longstanding
Georgia law that indemnification provisions do not cover losses caused
by the indemnitee’s own negligence unless the contract expressly,
plainly, clearly, and unequivocally so states.49 Some construction or
construction-related contracts include broad indemnification provisions
that nevertheless do not expressly state that the indemnitee’s own

39. O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b) (2019).
40. US Nitrogen, LLC, 343 F. Supp. 3d at 1358.
41. Id. at 1359 (emphasis omitted).
42. Id. at 1360.
43. Id.
44. See also US Nitrogen, LLC, 343 F. Supp. 3d 1354 (N.D. Ga. 2018) in the
immediately preceding section of this article.
45. 347 Ga. App. 400, 820 S.E.2d 141 (2018).
46. Id. at 405, 820 S.E.2d at 145.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 402, 820 S.E.2d at 143.
49. Id. at 405, 820 S.E.2d at 145.
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negligence is covered by that provision. 50 Careful drafting of
indemnification provisions is particularly important.
VI. WITNESS VALUE TESTIMONY
The main issue in Woodrum v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual
Insurance Company,51 a suit by homeowners against their homeowners
insurer, was whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting a
motion to exclude a contractor’s testimony about the diminution in
value of a house due to fallen tree damage. 52
The court of appeals first addressed whether the contractor should
have been allowed to testify as an expert. 53 Applying O.C.G.A.
§ 24-7-702(b),54 the court determined that the trial court had not abused
its discretion in barring the contractor from testifying as an expert
based on the trial court’s determination that the contractor’s estimate of
diminution in value was not based on any market comparison or related
methodology, and that his methodology was not sufficiently reliable. 55
In considering whether the trial court should have allowed the
contractor to testify as a lay witness, the court noted that O.C.G.A.
§ 24-7-70156 states that “[a] witness need not be an expert or dealer in
an article or property to testify as to its value if he or she has had an
opportunity to form a reasoned opinion.”57 The key question on this
issue, therefore, was whether the contractor had an opportunity to form
a reasoned opinion.58
The evidence provided in response to the insurer’s motion to exclude
the contractor’s testimony included that the contractor was a licensed
contractor, was experienced in home building and remodeling, was
familiar with the cost of construction and home values, had performed
repairs of the subject home, had determined that the house suffered
massive structural damage from the fallen tree,59 believed that the
50. Drafters of indemnification provisions should also remember that O.C.G.A.
§ 13-8-2 forbids an indemnification provision in a construction-related contract from
providing for indemnification of the indemnitee against the indemnitee’s sole negligence.
51. 347 Ga. App. 89, 815 S.E.2d 650 (2018).
52. Id. at 89, 815 S.E.2d at 651.
53. Id.
54. O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702(b) (2019).
55. Woodrum, 347 Ga. App. at 91–92, 815 S.E.2d at 652–53.
56. O.C.G.A. § 24-7-701 (2019).
57. Woodrum, 347 Ga. App. at 92, 815 S.E.2d at 653.
58. Id.
59. Not addressed by the court, or apparently the parties, was whether the
contractor, who was apparently not a professional engineer, was competent to testify
about structural issues upon which he based his lay opinion of value.
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foundation slab might reopen, and believed that a purchaser of the
home would be expected to pay less for the home given its cracked
slab.60 The court of appeals held that this experience provided the
contractor an opportunity to form a reasoned opinion and that the trial
court abused its discretion in excluding his testimony as a lay witness.61
VII. ACCEPTANCE DOCTRINE
In Thomaston Acquisition, LLC v. Piedmont Construction Group,
Inc.,62 the Georgia Supreme Court addressed two certified questions
from the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Georgia.63 Those questions arose out of a lawsuit in the district court in
which the purchaser of an apartment complex from its original owner
asserted negligent construction and breach of contract/implied
warranty claims against the general contractor that constructed the
complex for the original owner.64
The certified questions, which related only to the negligent
construction claim, were:
1. After construction of real property is completed, and the property
is sold by the original owner to a subsequent bona fide purchaser,
does the acceptance doctrine apply to a negligent construction claim
brought by a subsequent purchaser who is the current
owner-operator of the property at issue?
2. If the acceptance doctrine does apply, to whose inspection does the
analysis of whether the defect(s) was “readily observable on
reasonable inspection” relate: the original owner’s inspection, or a
subsequent owner’s inspection?65

The Georgia Supreme Court described the acceptance doctrine as
follows:
[A]n independent contractor is not liable for injuries to a third
person, occurring after the contractor has completed the work and
turned it over to the owner or employer and the same has been

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Woodrum, 347 Ga. App. at 92–93, 815 S.E.2d at 653.
Id. at 93, 815 S.E.2d at 654.
306 Ga. 102, 829 S.E.2d 68 (2019).
Id. at 102, 829 S.E.2d at 70.
Id.
Id. at 103, 829 S.E.2d at 70.
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accepted by him, though the injury result from the contractor’s
failure to properly carry out his contract.66

The court noted that the acceptance doctrine is typically asserted in
the context of post-acceptance claims for personal injury or damage to
other property caused by defective construction work, rather than in the
context of claims based on the defective work itself.67
However, in response to the first certified question, the court stated
that under Georgia law the acceptance doctrine does apply to a
negligent construction claim against the original contractor brought by
a purchaser of the property from the original owner.68 Because that
doctrine applies, the contractor is not liable to the purchaser for
negligent construction unless an exception to the acceptance doctrine
applies.69
The most significant exception noted by the court is for damages
arising from a defect hidden from reasonable inspection. Other
exceptions are also noted in the opinion.70 In response to the second
certified question, the court stated that under the hidden-defect
exception, a party asserting a negligent construction claim must show
that the defect was not “readily observable on reasonable inspection” at
the time that the work was accepted by the original owner—not at the
time that it was purchased by the subsequent purchaser. 71
VIII. APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES
Apportionment of damages under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-3372 can be
important in construction damages claims. Although the case was not a
construction case, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v.
Loudermilk73 addressed an issue potentially relevant to construction
cases. That question, which had been certified to the Georgia Supreme
Court by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
because of the lack of an earlier opinion by the Georgia appellate courts
66. Id. at 104, 829 S.E.2d at 71.
67. Id. at 104 n.1, 829 S.E.2d at 71 n.1.
68. Id. at 103, 829 S.E.2d at 70.
69. Id. at 106, 829 S.E.2d at 72.
70. Id. at 107–08, 829 S.E.2d at 73.
71. Id. at 108, 829 S.E.2d at 74. (Not addressed by the court was whether a plaintiff
purchaser/second owner must also demonstrate in connection with establishing a
negligent construction claim against the original contractor that the alleged defect was a
latent defect at the time of the plaintiff’s purchase. See generally Worthey v. Holmes, 249
Ga. 104, 287 S.E.2d 9 (1982). That additional proof would seem to also be required.)
72. O.C.G.A § 51-12-33 (2019).
73. 305 Ga. 558, 826 S.E.2d 116 (2019).
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squarely addressing it,74 was whether O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33 abrogated
Georgia’s common-law rule imposing joint and several liability on
tortfeasors who act in concert.75
The Georgia Supreme Court responded
that O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33 did not abrogate Georgia’s common-law rule
imposing joint and several liability on tortfeasors who act in concert
insofar as a claim of concerted action invokes the narrow and
traditional common-law doctrine of concerted action based on a legal
theory of mutual agency, and thus imputed fault.76

The court emphasized that its holding encompassed only traditional
concerted action, as it was understood at common law, for the basic
reason that fault in such scenarios is not divisible.77 It added that it
reached its conclusion after employing the touchstone inquiry in the
apportionment statute, which is whether fault is divisible.78
IX. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
Construction contracts often contain liquidated damages provisions.
Those provisions are enforceable if they meet certain conditions,
including that, if at the time of contracting, damages are difficult or
impossible to estimate. In Spirits, Inc. v. Patel,79 the Georgia Court of
Appeals stated that the alleged liquidated damages provision was
unenforceable because the damages were, in fact, not difficult or
impossible to estimate, and the party asserting the existence of the
liquidated damages provision had acknowledged as much during
argument at trial.80 This opinion implies that merely stating in the
contract that damages are difficult or impossible to estimate (which the
subject contract did not do) may not lead to an enforceable liquidated
damages provision if those damages are, in fact, not difficult or
impossible to estimate.81

74. 887 F.3d 1250, 1250–51 (11th Cir. 2018).
75. The Eleventh Circuit also certified two other questions to the Georgia Supreme
Court. See Loudermilk, 305 Ga. at 560, 826 S.E.2d at 118–19.
76. Id. at 560, 826 S.E.2d at 119.
77. Id. at 576, 826 S.E.2d at 129.
78. Id.
79. 350 Ga. App. 153, 828 S.E.2d 381 (2019).
80. Id. at 156, 828 S.E.2d at 385.
81. Id.
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X. IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY FOR EQUIPMENT
Trane US Inc. v. Yearout Service, LLC 82 involved a counterclaim by a
general contractor against the HVAC equipment supplier to a
subcontractor. The United States District Court for the Middle District
of Georgia treated that claim as one for breach of the implied warranty
of merchantability under O.C.G.A. § 11-2-314.83 The HVAC supplier
moved for summary judgment on that counterclaim arguing that a
warranty claim under O.C.G.A. § 11-2-314 can only be asserted by
someone in privity with the equipment seller. 84
The general contractor acknowledged that general rule, but
contended that (1) it was, in fact, in privity with the HVAC supplier;
and (2) it was an intended third-party beneficiary of the contract
between itself and its subcontractor, thereby allowing it to enforce that
contract under O.C.G.A. § 9-2-20(b),85 which states that “[t]he
beneficiary of a contract made between other parties for his benefit may
maintain an action against the promisor on the contract.”86
In support of its contention that it was in privity with the HVAC
supplier, the general contractor asserted two arguments. First, it
contended that the HVAC supplier was aware that the design and work
it was performing was to help the general contractor comply with its
agreement with the United States Army Corp of Engineers, which was
the owner of the subject project.87 The court rejected that argument
stating that even if true, it did not establish privity. 88 Second, the
general contractor contended that its agreement with the subcontractor
allowed the general contractor to require its subcontractor to assume
the obligations of the subcontractor to the general contractor. 89 The
district court also rejected that argument, pointing out that there was
no evidence that the general contractor actually required the
subcontractor to subcontract on those conditions or how that
permissible language would establish privity. 90
The court further rejected the general contractor’s assertion that it
was an intended third-party beneficiary of the warranty from the

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

No. 5:17-cv-00042-MTT, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210151 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 13, 2018).
O.C.G.A. § 11-2-314 (2019).
Trane US Inc., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210151, at *2.
O.C.G.A. § 9-2-20(b) (2019).
Trane US Inc., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210151, at *5–7.
Id. at *6.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *7.
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HVAC supplier to the subcontractor.91 It also stated that the general
contractor was not a “natural person” under O.C.G.A. § 11-2-318,92 and
therefore warranty rights did not extend to it under that code section. 93
For these reasons, the court granted the HVAC supplier’s motion for
summary judgment.94
XI. STATUTE OF REPOSE
Georgia Southern University Housing Foundation One, LLC v.
Capstone Development Corp.95 addressed issues relating to Georgia’s
construction-related statute of repose at O.C.G.A. § 9-3-51.96 Subject to
a limited exception in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-51(b), the statute states that an
action for a construction-related claim is barred if not brought within
eight years after substantial completion of the improvement. 97
More than eight years after substantial completion of the subject
project, the plaintiff filed a demand for arbitration against JLB
Construction LP (JLB), an entity that had not previously been a party
to this lawsuit. JLB filed a motion in the lawsuit to enjoin the
arbitration claim against it. In response, the plaintiff filed a motion to
amend its complaint to add JLB as a defendant.98 Although the plaintiff
acknowledged that more than eight years had expired since substantial
completion of the project, it argued that the statute of repose did not
bar the claims against JLB because those claims related back under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(B)99 to the date that the lawsuit
was originally filed against other defendants and that JLB was
equitably estopped from asserting the statute of repose as a defense. 100
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia
rejected the plaintiff’s relation-back argument for two reasons. First, it
did so because, under Rule 15(c)(1)(C),101 a claim relates back only when
it “changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a claim
91. Id. at *8.
92. O.C.G.A. § 11-2-318 (2019).
93. Trane US Inc., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210151, at *9.
94. Id.
95. No. 6:11-cv-104, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176075 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 12, 2018).
96. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-51(b) (2019).
97. A construction-related claim may also be barred by an earlier expiring statute of
limitation, such as the six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract at O.C.G.A.
§ 9-3-24 or the four-year statute of limitations for negligent construction at O.C.G.A.
§ 9-3-30(a). Ga. S. Univ. Hous. Found. One, LLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176075, at *11.
98. Id. at *6–8.
99. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(B).
100. Ga. S. Univ. Hous. Found. One, LLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176075, at *6–7.
101. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C).
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is asserted.”102 That code subsection does not apply when, as here, the
plaintiff seeks to join an entirely new defendant in addition to existing
defendants.103 Second, the court rejected the relation-back argument
because it was ineffective against a statute of repose.104
The court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that JLB was
equitably estopped from asserting the statute of repose. 105 The court
noted that, although a statute of repose cannot be tolled even in the face
of a defendant’s fraud, a defendant can, in narrow circumstances, be
equitably estopped from asserting the statute of repose as a defense. 106
Specifically, there must be evidence of the defendant’s fraud or other
conduct, which occurred after the accrual of a plaintiff’s claim, on which
that plaintiff reasonably relied in forbearing to bring a lawsuit.107
Here, the plaintiff contended that equitable estoppel applied because
JLB concealed its involvement in relevant repair work. 108 Rejecting that
argument, the court noted that the proposed amended complaint did not
allege sufficient facts to support that argument because allegations of
fraud and equitable estoppel must be supported by facts plead with
particularity.109 The court also noted that the plaintiff failed to show in
its motion to amend how JLB’s alleged concealment of its involvement
in the repairs prevented the plaintiff from learning about its
involvement, and failed to show that it had relied on an assertion or
action by JLB in forbearing to formally assert its claims against JLB. 110
For these reasons, the district court determined that the plaintiff’s
motion to amend its complaint to assert claims against JLB was
futile.111 Therefore, the court denied that motion. 112

102. Ga. S. Univ. Hous. Found. One, LLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176075, at *14
(emphasis omitted).
103. Id. at *14–15.
104. Id. at *15.
105. Id. at *17–18.
106. Id. at *17.
107. Id. at *17–18.
108. Id. at *18.
109. Id.
110. Id. at *19–20.
111. Id. at *22–23.
112. Id. at *23.

